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1. INTRODUCTION
The forecast and monitoring of fiscal policy and fiscal
accounts requires that data be released in a timely pattern.
The quality and amount of data referring to public sector
activity available in Spain depends on the level of
Government in question. While the amount of information
from the Central level of government
2 is rather large and is
provided with regularity and short lags, information for the
rest of the General Government is rather poor, as is provided
with rather long lags. In particular, data for State (Regional)
3
and for Local Governments is rather scarce. Such scarcity is
relevant when we take into account that, in 2006, State
Governments expenditure in Spain accounted for 14.6% of
GDP, while Local Governments accounted for 6.2%. The
increasing importance of lower levels of Government in the
determination of General Government expenditure has not
been accompanied by an equivalent increase in the amount of
information being published in relation to these decentralised
institutions. In particular, national accounts data for State
and Local Governments is released with a long delay and
with very little disaggregation. Hence, its usefulness for
forecasting purposes is rather limited. Information related to
budgetary data is more easily available, at least for the
Central and Regional Governments and with shorter delays
than national accounts data. Therefore, in spite of the fact
that such data cannot be directly integrated in the
macroeconomic scenario, as the latter are necessarily in
national account terms, it is worth considering its use for
monitoring and forecasting.
4 The comparison between initial
and final budgetary outcomes and final national accounts
data could provide an indicator of the usefulness of cash data
to recast the initial forecasts and monitor government’s
performance.
On the other hand, some information that cannot be
considered as referring to General Government under the
national accounting framework seem to be relevant for fiscal
policy analysis. In particular, such data correspond to
activities by public firms, and other public entities or are
associated to financing activities. Such data could provide
additional insight into the activity of the public sector, and
thus, in a broader assessment of the incidence of the public
sector, they should be taken into account.
5 However, the lack
of data on Public Private Partnership (PPP) activities in Spain
limits the scope of this approach.
6
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2 In fact, in all this paper, the term Central Government refers to central budgetary and non budgetary sections (Ministries, and the bodies and services reporting to
them) and Public Corporations classified as General Government.
3 In this paper, State (Regional) Governments include governing bodies of Regional (Autonomous) Governments (CCAA), their Administrative Agencies and similar,
Universities and Public Corporations classified as General Government, and Social Security units managed by the Regional Governments.
4 See J. Pérez (2005), for a model that integrates different public sector indicators to project fiscal outcomes.
5 We would like to include information on public firms that carry out quasi-fiscal activities, public-private partnerships, contingent liabilities plus government asset
funds. See the discussions carried out in the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund on which activities to include to assess global fiscal risk.
6 See L. Torres and V. Pina (2002), for an analysis of PPP initiatives in Local Governments.This article presents the information currently available for
the Spanish Central, State (Regional) and Local Government
and tries to assess its relevance for forecasting, monitoring or
structural analysis. In particular, by comparing the different
trends in public finances provided by different accounting
frameworks, it tries to assess their usefulness for short-term
analysis, both in terms of forecasting and monitoring or for a
more structural analysis. The article is structured as follows.
In Section 2 we review the framework that defines budgetary
arrangements in place in Spain. In the next two Sections we
compare initial budgetary data, which is rather easy to obtain
early in the fiscal year, with actual outturn and with national
accounts data which is used to integrate government’s activity
with the rest of the economy. Section 5 moves away from
national accounts, and assesses the inclusion in the analysis of
information contained in public debt data, and other
available data referring to public sector activity that is either
carried out by institutions that are currently classified outside
the Government sector in national accounts terms or that
correspond to financial activity. Conclusions are drawn from
the comparison between trends and levels in national
accounts balances for the different levels of Government and
the trends and levels resulting from such a broader approach. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
CENTRAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT BUDGETS
The Central, Regional and Local Governments in Spain
organize themselves in a general administration, which is
composed of different administrative units, and an
institutional administration that is composed of different
autonomous organisms (administrative, financial,
commercial…) and public entities and enterprises to provide
some services. Both General administration and institutional
administration are different from municipality to
municipality and region to region in relation to the number
of institutions, their denomination and functions. However,
there are some common factors among all levels of
government, such as the fact that budgets need parliamentary
(or the municipal representatives’) endorsement to be
implemented and if they have not been approved by January
1st, they are automatically extended. Moreover, all levels of
Government produce annual budgets that match natural
years.
The Law that established the Autonomous financing system
(Ley Orgánica 8/1980, of 22nd September) requires Regional
Governments to produce budget laws that share
homogeneous criteria in order for them to be able to be
consolidated with the budget of the Central Government.
The homogeneity is reflected in the fact that each regional
and local budget and the Central budget share the same
classification for revenue and expenditure chapters both for
non financial and financial items. However, the institutional
coverage does not need to be the same.
7
The case of Regional Governments
The size of Regional Governments has been growing for
many years. The recovery of democracy triggered a process
of decentralization that, although it has already reached a
rather mature stage, is still evolving and has not settled down.
While the Constitution clearly specifies expenditure
responsibilities across the different levels of government it
only sets general principles as far as the financing system is
concerned. Such asymmetric treatment has led to a periodic
reconsideration of financing arrangements, starting in 1986
for Regional Governments, after an initial transitory period.
Since that date, a series of agreements lasting five years each
has defined a process, which has implied an increasing
transfer to regions of responsibilities on the expenditure side,
which has been ill matched with an equivalent transfer of
resources or the capacity of raising them. In particular, the
transfer of taxing capacity is still rather limited.
The process has not been homogeneous, neither through time
nor among Regional Governments. In terms of powers
assumed there have been major distinctions between those
regions that had education and health responsibilities and
those that had neither or only one of them. The last
agreement, reached in 2002, when all regions assumed health
care responsibilities, aimed at being the definitive one as,
since then, all regions, with the exception of the Basque
Country and Navarre, have the same expenditure
responsibilities under a common financing system.
In terms of financing arrangements, the largest differences
lays on the distinction between “ordinary regime” regions,
with limited fiscal autonomy and “specific status” regions
(the Basque Country and Navarre), with larger financial
autonomy. Because of historical developments, the Basque
Country and Navarre enjoy considerable freedom in
establishing and administering personal and corporate
income taxes. For these regions, most expenditure
responsibilities have been devolved with the only notable
exception of pensions, which are still administered by the
central social security system. Both regions contribute to the
central government with a fixed share of GDP to cover the
expenditures that remain in the hands of the central
government, including defence and nationwide
infrastructure.
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7This affects mainly health expenditure and its budgetary treatment.The decentralization process has progressed in the direction
of enhancing fiscal co-responsibility, although there is still
considerable room for larger changes in this area. In
particular, under the 2002 agreement, the one that prevails
now, the sources of financing for the “ordinary regime”
regions include shared taxes,
8 transferred taxes for which
Regional Governments cannot change neither the tax rates
nor the rules, but receive,
9 own taxes
10 and transfers from the
Central government.
11
The level of decentralization is rather large as shown in
Figure 1, which presents the proportions of certain categories
of revenue and expenditure in national accounts terms in the
hands of State and Local Governments over the sum of these
same expenditures and revenue channelled through State,
Local and Central Governments. In all the categories
analysed there has been an increase in the weight of State
Governments. In particular, the increase has resulted in more
than 40% of the sum being in the hands of State Government
in the case of indirect taxation, and investment, while both
components of consumption in the hands of State
Governments account for more than 60% of the overall
expenditure. The minor weight played by interest payments
results from the fact that no transfer of debt in the hands of
Central Government was made to State Governments when
decentralization took place.
Therefore, while in the 1980s the limited amount of
information in relation to State Government budgetary data
was not so relevant for the analysis of General Government
developments, the decentralization process has implied that
data for State and local Governments is growing more and
more crucial for the analysis of fiscal policy in Spain
In 2002, the Budgetary Stability Laws (BSL, Leyes de
Estabilidad Presupuestaria) were passed, establishing a rule
that mandated a balanced budget or a surplus at the sub
national level on a yearly basis. While in aggregate terms, the
State Government sub sector managed to comply with the
rule in 2003 (the first year of implementation), 11 out of the
17 regions ran a deficit that year, reflecting the low
enforcement capacity of the Law. A reformed Law was
passed in 2006, which aims at increasing ownership and
observance by the regions, as well as providing explicit room
for counter-cyclical action. It also requests the Central
Government to run a balanced budget or a surplus, without
allowing its consolidation with the Social Security Funds. It is
still too early to assess its effectiveness.
The case of Local Governments
The Local Government Finance Act (Ley Reguladora de las
Haciendas Locales (1988)) established the main elements
which define the current local financing system for
municipalities and other local organisms. Not only did it
imply the end of the existing dependence based model, it also
brought new resources into the system.
12 It introduced
revenue autonomy for local governments as it allowed them
to establish the rates of local taxes (with a lower and upper
cap), which, moreover, were simplified and reduced in
number. It also established a formula based transfer system
that has been revised every five years. Moreover, the Act
allowed Local governments to issue debt, within certain
limits.
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8 In particular, 100 percent of the tax on retail sales of hydrocarbon fuels, 100 percent of special taxes on particular cars and 33 percent of personal income tax revenues.
Moreover, Regional Governments are given the discretion of increasing by up to 20 percent the marginal personal income tax rate and may introduce new deductions.
9 In particular, 35 percent of VAT revenues, 40 percent of some excises, 100 percent of taxes on electricity and vehicle registration and other minor indirect taxes.
10 Regional Governments have exclusive power to tax gifts, wealth, legal documents, and gambling. Starting in 2002, the Regional Governments have freedom to set
the rates and the exceptions for these taxes.
11The major part of central government transfers to the Regional Governments is channelled through the “Sufficiency Fund”, which is intended to cover the gap
between the mandatory expenditures and revenues accruing to the Regional Governments. The initial amount of the sufficiency fund was calculated as the difference
between the estimated cost of the Regional Governments mandates and revenues calculated in the year 1999. Every year this amount is increased at the same rate
as the central government’s tax revenues. In addition to the “Sufficiency Fund”, some Regional Governments also receive resources from other funds, including the
Interregional Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial), which is the main instrument for regional development and is coordinated with regional
transfers from the European Community.




































































































































State (Reg.) 1981 Local 1981 Central 1981
State (Reg.) 2006 Local 2006 Central 2006
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance and Bank of Spain.
1 Structure of 1981 based on ESA79. Structure of 2006 based on ESA2000.In 2002, the Law was reformed and the amended act is what
is nowadays applicable. Currently, Spanish local authorities
levy five taxes: property tax, business tax, vehicle tax, tax on
buildings and tax on land value increase in urban areas. The
first three taxes are compulsory in the sense that they have to
be collected by all local councils. The remaining two are
optional and municipalities may also collect fees and user
charges.
The other main source of financing for local governments,
representing around a fourth of total non financial local
revenue, is transfers from other levels of Government, in
particular the Central Government. The largest transfer from
the central government to municipalities is the municipalities’
sharing in central taxes (Participación Municipal en los
Ingresos del Estado (PMIE)). It is a non conditional current
transfer, whose total amount is revised every five years, and
whose distribution is determined in relation to some specific
criteria such as population, educational units, revenue raising
capacity or tax effort.
3. BUDGETARY DATA: INITIAL
PROJECTIONS AND OUTCOMES
Central Government
The information released for the Central Government budget
and budgetary outturn does not suffer from large delays. In
fact, the information referring to the closing of the previous
fiscal year is available with a two month lag. Moreover,
during the fiscal year, a large amount of budgetary data is
released with a very short time lag, thus providing the
opportunity for monitoring expenditure and revenue at the
central level during the fiscal year.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the Central Government has been
budgeting deficits in each and every year from 1985 to 2006,
with a peak in 1994. The deficit trend was declining up to
1991, with an increasing trend since up to 1994, when a
downward trend started again up to 2001. As for the outturn,
the State shows a surplus in two out of six years of the
current decade, with no other surplus being reached in the
period under analysis. The peak deficit was attained in 1993
and the largest surplus in 2006.
The closing balance for the Central Government was much
poorer than initially budgeted in most of the fiscal years in
the decade of the 1990s, in 1985 and 2001. For the rest of
the years, the outturn was better than initially budgeted. In
fact, it may seem that there is a trend towards larger positive
differences between outturn and initial budget since 2002,
with the largest difference being the one observed in 2005.
13
Regional Governments
The Ministry of Finance and in particular the Dirección
General de Coordinación Financiera con las CCAA, gathers
all the data referring to the annual budgets approved by each
State Government and releases consolidated data for their
General Administration and its different organisms, after its
transformation. Moreover, it provides the consolidated
budget for the aggregate State Government sector. The most
recent data refers only to budgetary chapters (available with
a three month lag, approximately), while a larger
disaggregation of the data is published much later (one and a
half years, approximately) so that a functional expenditure
budget is also provided. Currently, the latest available
information on consolidated regional budgets refers to 2007
and the detailed one to 2006.
As far as data on outturn are concerned, the Ministry of
Finance publishes a first estimate, which is disaggregated by
budgetary chapters with over a 18 month delay, so that
currently the latest information available corresponds to
2005.
14 Even later, the Ministry releases more detailed
information for regional finances, including a functional
approach. The latest detailed information covers up to 2003.
Information referring to both initial budgets and outturns for
State Governments is presented in Figure 3 for the period
1985 2006 (with the 2006 outturn being an estimate). As can
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Figure 2




























































































































SOURCE: Ministry of Economy and Finance and Bank of Spain.
13The BSL in place since 2002 sets a ceiling on central government spending. It also sets a contingency fund to deal with unforeseen circumstances, and forces the
dedication of any social security surplus to the pension reserve fund.
14To build the figures, we have projected the outturn for 2006, taking into account the data contained in the EDP Notification.be seen, State Governments have always projected a
budgetary deficit, the only exception being 2003. The
budgeted deficit over GDP increased up to 1992 and then
declined until 2003, when, after the projected surplus, a new
upward trend started.
On the other hand, the budgetary outturn recorded a surplus
in six years (1988, 1999, 2003 2006). It also followed a
similar pattern to the one shown for the projections: an
increasing deficit up to 1991 and a declining trend since, but
not as systematic.
We observe that, in general, the closing balance attained was
much better than the initial balance projection. Only in very
few years, the balance was much worse than initially
envisaged (1991, 1993 and 2001), while in very few others
the negative difference (outturn budget) was rather small.
The largest positive differences seem to show up at the end of
the 1980s and 1990s, periods in which real GDP growth was
relatively high. We must remember that the devolution
process justifies some of the differences that we observe
between projections and outcomes as the budgets were being
designed before the transfer of responsibilities and thus of the




The Ministry of Finance and in particular the Dirección
General de Coordinación Financiera con las EELL, gathers all
the data referring to the annual budgets approved by large
municipalities and publishes with a delay of two years a
summary of the initial budgets and the outcomes.
As can be seen in Figure 4, showing data on budgets and
outturn from 1992 to 2006, at the aggregate level, Local
Governments have always projected a deficit, which declined
up to 2000 and then rose until 2002. Except for the first two
years, the outcome has always recorded a surplus.
4. NATIONAL ACCOUNTS DATA
Information in national accounts terms for the whole General
Government is available with high frequency and very short
delays. The updated Stability Programme, the Excessive
Deficit Protocol (EDP) Notifications, and the economic
objectives which the Government needs to announce in the
first term of the previous year for which the projections are
defined, are all set in national accounts terms, so that this
accounting framework is central for monitoring purposes.
Detailed national accounts data for each State Government are
not available until two and a half years after the end of the fiscal
period, so that a comparison among the different State
governments can only be done with a significant delay. Only the
aggregate State and Local Governments balances, but not their
composition, are known at an earlier date, with a three-month
lag (at the time of EDP notification by the end of March).
As for the Central Government, data in national accounts
terms are available soon after the end of the fiscal year. In
fact, during the year, monthly data on the balance are made
available in both cash and national accounts terms, with more
detailed information for the former.
During the 2000 2006 period, the Central Government
recorded an improvement in its fiscal balance in national
AVAILABLE DATA ON BUDGET AND OFF BUDGET ACTIVITIES OF SPANISH CENTRAL...
TEMPORARY MEASURES AND OFF-BUDGET ACTIVITIES 47
Figure 3
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SOURCE: Ministry of Economy and Finance (“D.G. de Coordinación
Financiera con las CCAA”) and Bank of Spain.
Figure 4
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Budget Outturn
SOURCE: Institute for Fiscal Studies, Ministry of Economy and Finance
(“D.G. de Coordinación Financiera con las EELL”) and Bank of Spain.
15 See Argimón, I. and Martí, F. (2006) for a more disaggregated analysis.accounts terms, expressed as a ratio over GDP (Figure 5).
The exception to this trend took place in 2004, when
exceptional circumstances, related mainly to the
reorganization of the railways infrastructure system, resulted
in temporary expenditures. In particular, they took the form
of capital transfers, corresponding to the debt assumption
from RENFE, the national railway company (0.7% of GDP)
and the public television broadcaster RTVE (0.1% of GDP).
In 2005, a surplus was attained and in 2006 this was even
improved upon.
As for State Governments, the balance in national accounts
terms has been slightly improving, except in 2004, but
showing negative values except for 2006 when a balanced
budget was recorded. 
A rather different pattern from State Governments emerges
for the national accounts balance data of Local Governments,
as they record a tiny deficit over GDP or even a small surplus
in 2000 and 2004. Since 2004 a worsening can be observed.
In the lower part of Figure 5 for each level of government,
we include a comparison between the initial and final
outcomes in budgetary terms and between the actual
budgetary outcome and the national accounts data. A green
positive value indicates that the actual deficit (surplus) in
budgetary terms was higher (lower) than initially budgeted
and the value measures the difference in GDP terms. A red
positive value indicates that the deficit (surplus) in national
accounts terms was larger (smaller) than actual budgetary
deficit (surplus).
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Figure 5
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SOURCES: Ministry of Economy and Finance (“Estadísticas territoriales”), Institute for Fiscal Studies and Bank of Spain.
(a) Initial budget balance minus Budget outturn.
(b) Budget outturn minus NA balance.The comparison between the budgetary outturn and the
national accounts data shows that the outcome is always
worse in national accounts terms than in budgetary terms, for
the three levels of Government, with the exception of 2003
for the Central Government. The major items that usually
explain the adjustment between the two accounting
methodologies are capital injections into public enterprises
and cancellation of taxes. In some years, the advances to State
Governments can also play an important role in the
adjustment corresponding to the Central Government. In
particular, while in the case of Local Governments and State
(Regional) Governments the adjustment was always below
0.4% and 0.6% of GDP, respectively, in the case of the
Central Government it reached over 1% in 2004 due to the
already mentioned RENFE effect. For the rest of the years in
the Central Government the adjustment was below 0.5 pp. of
GDP. 
5. BEYOND NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
Up to here, we have been analysing information that is
contained within the limits established by the national
accounts framework. It is, however, worth analysing the
public sector activity beyond the limits set by such an
approach, not only because some of these activities may
imply contingent public liabilities that in the future will show
up in those accounts, but also because public intervention
adopts different approaches, which can be channelled
through means and institutions not well aligned with the
national accounts framework. Moreover, institutions evolve
over time so that it could be the case that there is a change in
the statistical classification of units from the government to
the non government sector, and the other way round. The
reclassification of such units would imply that the liabilities
they were holding would be transferred inside or outside the
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Figure 6
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SOURCES: Ministry of Economy and Finance (“Estadísticas territoriales”), Institute for Fiscal Studies and Bank of Spain.
(*) Debt (EDP, excl. FA Deposits) plus Guarantees plus Public enterprises´debt. (c) NA balance plus change in Debt (EDP, excl. FA Deposits). (d) Change
in Guaratees. (e) Change in Public enterprises´debt.government following the change (as in the RENFE) case.
Public enterprises tend to be one of the units more often
affected by such reclassification, as the conditions of their
previous classification within the private sector (unit mainly
financed by the market) are not fulfilled anymore.
16 But
public firms are not the only source of discrepancies.
Deficit debt adjustments
When the government budget records a deficit in the non
financial accounts, the equivalent amount should be found in
its financial accounts where its increase of liabilities should
exceed the increase in financial assets to finance this deficit.
In case of a surplus, the accumulation of financial assets
should exceed its transactions in liabilities at the same value
as the surplus.
17 The deficit debt adjustment records the
variation in debt that is not accounted for by the deficit and
surplus and may thus reflect part of the activity carried out by
public sector which is not reflected in the data recorded in
national accounts terms. In fact, its analysis may reveal
inconsistencies between the financial and non financial data
which could be used to assess weaknesses in the fiscal data.
Moreover, the Financial Assets (FA) Deposits that are
included in the definition of EDP debt can hardly be regarded
as corresponding to any activity carried out by the public
sector, as these assets can be more associated with cash
management needs. Therefore, we propose to exclude them
from debt data (see upper part of Figure 6, continuous line)
and analyse the dynamics of the remaining deficit-debt
adjustment ratio. A positive (negative) value of the
adjustment implies that the increase (decline) in debt that we
have observed is larger (smaller) than the deficit (surplus) that
has been recorded in national accounts terms.
Contrary to what we might expect, we observe mostly
negative values for the adjustment in all levels of Government
data (lower part of Figure 6). The main difference between
the different levels of Government lays on the size of the
adjustment. In the case of the Central Government it can
reach just over 1 pp of GDP (in 2003 in negative terms) while
in the case of State Governments its highest value is below
0.4 pp of GDP (in 2002) and in the case of Local
Governments it is just above 0.4% of GDP in 2006.
However, given that the debt ratios for State and Local
Governments are much smaller than the corresponding ratio
for the Central Government, the deficit debt adjustment has
a marginally larger impact on regional and local accounts. In
particular, while the deficit debt adjustment for the Central
Government accounts only for less than 3% of the debt ratio,
it reaches over 10% in the case of State and Local
Governments.
Other data
An assessment of the fiscal activity carried out by a broader
definition of the public sector unit could also include the debt
held by all public firms, which are currently classified in the
private corporate sector. This does not prejudge that these
enterprises are going to be reclassified within the General
government sector. In fact, such reclassifications are rather
rare. However, the analysis of such units may provide some
further insight into public sector activity, as national accounts
are nothing else but a very useful accounting convention.
In any case, the weight of public enterprises debt over GDP
is below 2% for the Central Government, below 1% for
Regional Governments and below 0.5% for Local
Governments (Figure 7). It seems that the State Government
public enterprises debt ratio shows an increasing trend and
the Local one a constant trend that are partially in contrast
with a declining debt ratio for Central Government
enterprises up to 2004, when we observe an increase in the
latter. The relevance of public enterprise debt is large for
State Governments as this debt reaches above 13% of the sum
of both EDP and public enterprises debt. In the case of the
Central Government, such debt accounts for less than 5% of
the total amount of debt.
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16 It could be argued that the reliance on public firms or the use of PPP for the provision of goods and services aims at hiding public expenditure from published
accounts. However, it could also be argued that different functional forms or property arrangements can deliver different outcomes, so that the real aim is to enhance
efficiency in the provision of goods and services.
17To sum up, one can say that the deficit debt adjustments (DDA) are the variation in debt that is not accounted for by the deficit/surplus. Therefore, they include
elements such as (1) the statistical discrepancy between financial and non-financial accounts, (2) the net acquisition of financial assets minus the net incurrence of
liabilities that are not EDP instruments, (3) the market to face value adjustment, (4) the foreign exchange holding gains and losses and (5) other changes in volume
of the debt.In Figure 6 (lower part), we include for each one of the three
different levels of government the change in the total amount
of debt over GDP held by public enterprises as an additional
but independent element for consideration. In the case of the
Central Government, the changes in the ratio of public
enterprises debt go in both directions so that there are
increases and decreases in outstanding debt by public
enterprises. That is no so in the case of State and Local
Governments, where we observe a positive contribution to
debt by public firms, except in 2000 for State Governments.
Another element that can be analysed is the provision of
public guarantees to private firms, which the different levels
of government can offer. These can be regarded as contingent
liabilities, as they may need to be made use of in the future.
18
As the only available data refers to the Central Government,
Figure 6 only includes the changes in the amount of these
guarantees for this level of government: a positive value
implies that the volume is growing in GDP terms. As the
figure shows, the changes are rather small and have both
signs. The volume of such guarantees is reflected in Figure 7,
where it can be seen that they are on a declining trend.
The dotted line in Figure 6 reflects the sum of the newly
defined debt ratio plus public enterprise debt plus guarantees
that the government has provided to private firms at full
value (the latter only for the Central Government). As we can
see, the difference between the two series is not large,
especially for the Central Government, especially if we take
into account the total weight of the debt.
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SOURCES: Ministry of Economy and Finance (“Estadísticas territoriales”), Institute for Fiscal Studies and Bank of Spain.6. CONCLUSION
From all the information gathered and presented so far a new
measure for the budgetary balance could be built and
compared with the initial budgetary projections. This is done
by adding to the initial budget, the final outturn, the national
accounts adjustment, the deficit debt adjustment defined on
debt net of FA deposits, the changes in public enterprise debt
and the changes in public guarantees (only in the case of the
Central Government).
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The new budgetary balance thus built for a very broadly
defined public sector tends to record a surplus in the case of
the Central Government that may be said to show an
increasing trend (Figure 8). State (Regional) Governments
show a completely different pattern, so that the budget for
the broad public sector is in deficit during most of the years,
but also on an improving trend, so that it also shows a surplus
in 2004 and 2006. The balance for Local Governments show
a declining trend up to 2003, when it starts improving again.
In fact, a surplus is observed in 2000 and from 2004 to 2006.
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SOURCES: Ministry of Economy and Finance (“Estadísticas territoriales”), Institute for Fiscal Studies and Bank of Spain.
(**) Initial budget balance plus adjustmens (a+b+c+d+e). (a) Initial budget balance minus Budget outturn. (b) Budget outturn minus NA balance. 
(c) NA balance plus change in Debt (EDP, excl. FA Deposits). (d) Change in Guaratees. (e) Change in Public enterprises’ debt.
19 In other words, we add to national accounts data the deficit-debt adjustment, the changes in public enterprise debt and the changes in public guarantees.On the other hand, the new budget figure obtained is over
the initial budget projection in the cases of the Central and
Local Government and below such projection in the case of
State (Regional) Governments. That is, the budgetary
projection released by Local and Central Governments shows
a deficit that when the public sector at large is taken into
account does not materialise, so that the final balance records
a surplus or at least a lower deficit. The contrary occurs with
aggregate State (Regional) Government accounts, so that the
projected deficit in budgetary terms is surpassed by the deficit
computed with a broad definition of the public sector.
The role played in the difference between initial budgetary
projections and the budget thus obtained by each of the
components we have analysed is reflected in the lower part of
Figure 8, where the total and an additive decomposition is
shown. As can be seen, in the cases of the Central and Local
Governments the main source of the difference is the
discrepancy between the initial budget and the final outcome
in cash terms (green bar). The deficit debt adjustment (blue
bar) has also played an important role in some years,
reinforcing the difference. In the case of State (Regional)
Governments, the adjustment between cash outturn and
national accounts data (red bar) drives most of the difference,
being usually reinforced by the change in public enterprise
debt ratio.
We could then conclude that a broader approach to public
sector data than the one provided by the national accounts
data shows that in the case of Spain, the different levels of
government seem to respond to different patterns of
budgeting.
The Central Government seems to overestimate the deficit,
in the sense that when we consider a broad public sector
which includes public enterprises and even public
guarantees, the computed deficit turns out to be much lower
than initially budgeted, or even a surplus is reached. In the
case of the Central Government, the main factor which
explains this difference can be found in actual revenue being
larger than initially expected or expenditure turning out to
be much lower (mainly interest payments) than initially
programmed. A similar pattern seems to reflect Local
Government budgeting. State (Regional) Governments seem
to show a completely different pattern, so that the final
computed deficit which a broadly defined public sector
would attain is larger than the one initially budgeted. The
main factor explaining such difference is the necessary
adjustment between budget outturn and national accounts
data. Capital injections into public enterprises and increases
in the debt of these firms are at the root of the discrepancy.
State (Regional) Governments are responsible for the
management of large expenditure items related to public
AVAILABLE DATA ON BUDGET AND OFF BUDGET ACTIVITIES OF SPANISH CENTRAL...
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SOURCES: Ministry of Economy and Finance (“Estadísticas territoriales”), Institute for Fiscal Studies and Bank of Spain.
(**) Initial budget balance plus adjustmens (a+b+c+d+e, see Figure 8).services that are relevant for potential growth, such as
education and health. In fact, they account for 90% of the
expenditure that the General Government devotes to such
matters. Therefore, the need to increase efficiency in the
provision of such services is in their hands and need to be
reflected in their accounts.
In cumulative terms, initial budgets have projected an
improvement in the Central Government finances of 0.4 pp
of GDP between 2000 and 2006, which has amounted to 1.6
pp in national accounts terms (Figure 9). With the broad
definition of public sector, the improvement is only 0.6 pp of
GDP. A similar pattern emerges from State (Regional)
Government accounts: in national accounts an improvement
amounting to 0.5 pp of GDP was recorded, while the broad
definition shows a 0.3 pp improvement. In the case of Local
Governments, national accounts record a worsening of 0.3
pp while the broad definition records an improvement of less
than 0.1 pp. Therefore, a broad definition of public sector
seems to record a smaller improvement in budgetary accounts
both for Central and State (Regional) Governments than
when national accounts figures are taken into account, while
the opposite happens with Local accounts.
The new framework set by the Budgetary Stability Laws asks
for regions to attain a budget balance or a surplus in national
accounts terms, thus involving these decentralized units with
the compromise set by the Stability and Growth Pact.
Budgetary data could be used as a proxy to carry out the
analysis of regional fiscal policy, both ex ante and ex post and
thus, of assessing the feasibility of the targets set, before and
during the year when they are operative. In any case, a
broader definition of the public sector could help understand
part of the activity which is carried out by public units and
which the current accounting framework does not cover.
However, it would be better to improve the availability of
timely information on the activities carried out by
decentralised units. The lack of timely and comprehensive
information makes it difficult to ensure fiscal discipline at
lower levels of government, where we observe that the
budget tends to underestimate the activity carried out by a
broad definition of public sector with a negative impact on
the accounts.
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